In Breakable Glasses: Toward a Naturalist Orientational Cosmology by Bunting, Marylu
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Boston Theological Institute Journal of Faith and Science Exchange
2012-08-21
In Breakable Glasses: Toward a
Naturalist Orientational Cosmology
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/3946
Boston University
In Breakable Glasses:
Toward a Naturalist Orientational Cosmology
Marylu Bunting
Division of Religious and Theological Studies
Boston University
The author develops the formula, "that process that gives rise to all that exists," as a
specification of the cosmos within which human life may find meaningful, ethical orienta-
tion. Her position intends to be consonant with the natural sciences and conversant with
traditional orientational cosmologies of the world religions. After analyzing each ofthe key
terms in this central formula, she provisionally proposes three ethical stances (humility,
responsibility, and celebration) that might follow from orientation to the cosmos seen as
"that process that gives rise to all that exists."
Introduction
Human existence is a question in search
of an answer. From the first moment of self-
consciousness, my existence has pushed me
to ask the questions: Why do I exist? 1 and
how can I make my existence meaningful?
There are no obvious answers to these two
questions. Human beings participate in
many religions, which provide various an-
swers, usually commensurate with, or react-
ing against, their originary cultural context.
In the highly scientific cultural context of
end-of-the-twentieth-century America, the
answers of the religions no longer seem plau-
sible, at least to me; and I am left searching
by myself for an orientation to existence.
What I seek is an account of my existence
that would provide meaningful orientation
for my own life within the context of the im-
mense cosmos, the living earth, and the di-
versity of human societies. Such meaning-
ful orientation would include ethical stances
that would fruitfully relate me to other hu-
man beings and the natural world. I am
searching, then, for an account of existence
consonant with the natural sciences and ap-
preciative of the natural world. I am search-
ing for a naturalist orientational cosmology. 2
In this essay, I attempt to develop just such
a cosmology by specifying what I take to be
the context of ultimate significance to be "that
process that gives rise to all that exists." 3 I
view this process scientifically and naturalis-
tically. My argument will proceed through
four interrelated sections that examine the ex-
pression, that process that gives rise to all that
exists, from its beginning to its end. In these
four sections, I undertake a close investiga-
tion and explication of the individual elements
of this expression. In the fifth and final sec-
tion, I return to the question of existence and
its meaning and indicate what I see as one po-
tential ethical framework provided by an ori-
entation to this process.
The goal is to begin to develop a natu-
ralist orientational cosmology that is open
enough to be thoroughly integrated with the
natural sciences, and evocative enough to
provide for meaningful human orientation
and ethical reflection. At many points, I will
be able to give only the briefest and most
general outlines of what a cosmology in its
final form would look like. Nevertheless, I
hope to begin the types of reflection that will
bring me closer to its formulation, adequate
not only for myself but also for all those who
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find the question of existence most plausi-
bly addressed via a naturalist perspective.
"That process..."
The first thing I specify concerning the
"frame of ultimate significance" for human
life is its location in a process. One might
rightly ask why I have chosen to call this
frame a process and what I mean by it. Cer-
tainly alternative formulations could be
used—such as the contention of the
Abrahamic traditions that ultimate signifi-
cance is found within the Kingdom of God
or the chosen people, or the contention of
certain schools of Buddhism that it is found
within nirvana, or the contention of certain
schools of Hinduism that the "frame of ulti-
mate significance" is Brahman. In this sec-
tion, therefore, I will address the questions
"Why process?" and "What process?". In
response to the first, I will defend my choice
of the word process as both concrete and
vague and therefore suitable to describe the
cosmos which the natural sciences represent.
In response to the second, I will indicate what
I take to be the natural content and rationally
intelligible nature of the process.
Why process?
As a naturalist, I am searching for a term
denoting the "frame of ultimate signifi-
cance." I want a term that can capture what
I take to be the development of the natural
world as the natural sciences approximate
this development. Because of the content
and nature of the natural sciences them-
selves, I need a term that is concrete and
vague. It must be concrete in the sense of
being temporal, historical, and denoting a
unitary process constituted by plurality. It
must be vague in the sense of allowing for
change and amendment in the natural sci-
ences themselves. In this section. I will ar-
gue that process is just such a concrete and
vague term.
In regard to the concrete, process can
have the sense of temporality, historicity,
and unity encompassing plurality. I need
a term implying temporality and historic-
ity, because science reveals a spatiotem-
poral cosmos whose currently observed
character is a result of historical interac-
tions and development. Process is a good
candidate because it can imply temporal
phenomena as seen in the derivative words
procession and proceed. One element fol-
lows another temporally in a process or in
a procession, like the bride and her brides-
maids in procession down the aisle at a
wedding, or like a mother duck and her
ducklings in their procession from their
nest to the pond or stream, or as a reaction
proceeds after the combination of two
chemicals.
Moreover, process can imply historical
phenomena in the sense that anything that
proceeds temporally can be said to have both
a past and future without which it would not
be what it is. A recombinant gene therapy
to aid in glycolysis would not arise without
the historical process of experimentation as
part of its development. Similarly the oxy-
gen and nitrogen mainstays of Earth's atmo-
sphere would not have arisen without some
historical proceeding of a series of reactions
to bond the requisite particles together. In
this sense, saying that process is a term im-
plying temporality is also to say that it im-
plies historicity.
Process can also imply unity in the con-
text of plurality. I need a term denoting
"unity in the context of plurality," because
the natural sciences have come to understand,
and attempts to approximate in its develop-
ing understandings, a cosmos that issues from
the singularity of the Big Bang. The cosmos
is unitary in that sense; at the same time, it is
plural in that many different, though related,
entities—from subatomic particles to super-
novae—have arisen as a result of the Big
Bang.4 The cosmos arising from the Big
Bang is composed of many entities and pro-
cesses, but one can ultimately refer it, in its
entirety, back to the one process of expan-
sion and cooling arising from the Big Bang.
This phenomenon of unity in the con-
text of plurality may be seen at other levels
Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 1999
of the cosmic process as well. In biology,
for example, in Margulis' account of evolu-
tion, 5 increased complexity in organisms
can arise both as a result of the combina-
tion of less complex organisms, and also as
a result of the prolonged separation of
equally complex organisms. While evolu-
tion denotes the entire stretch of such com-
bination and divergence, it also denotes the
pluriform occasions of combination and
divergence without which evolution would
not arise. Moreover, this example illustrates
that a unitary process can be constituted
with regard both to a plurality of entities
and to a plurality of processes—all within
the one unitary process.
Since it can bear the meaning of all of
these senses of unity in the context of plu-
rality, as well as of temporality and historic-
ity, process is a good candidate for the term
denoting the "frame of ultimate signifi-
While attempting to understand and
orient oneself within this natural and
rationally intelligible process, one is
oneself always already both natural and
rational, and always already within the
very process that one seeks to under-
stand and orient oneself within.
tegrate yet more information. The case is
the same throughout the sciences. The ac-
count of nature put forward by the natural
sciences has also undergone, and contin-
ues to undergo, amendment as a result of
more adequate or different metaphorical
paradigms.
My central denoting term thus needs to
be similarly open to new information and
amendment. Process can bear this burden
because it does not depend on any specific
interpretation that the natural sciences pro-
pose, but rather it relies on the overall flow
of the sciences' representation of the cosmos.
The choice of process, therefore, is not
founded so much on the individual details,
as on the consensus of the natural sciences
that the cosmos is a spatiotemporal phenom-
enon that changes as it expands spatially and
temporally. Process is. therefore, both spe-
cific enough and open enough to be heuristi-
cally valuable with regard
to human meaning and eth-
ics, as I argue below. 7
cance." It can take on the concrete dimen-
sions of the cosmos that scientific experi-
ment and approximation represent.
Nevertheless, in their own develop-
ment, the sciences also suggest the need for
a term that is open to new information and
amendment. Big Bang theory and evolu-
tionary biology are just two examples of
areas in which scientists have significantly
developed and changed their views, as
growing quantities of data emerged after
the introduction of the theory/' Scientists
continue to amend both theories as they in-
What process?
If I am talking about a
process that is suggested
and studied in the natural
sciences, then I am talking
about a process that is natu-
ral in content and rationally
intelligible in character.
This section is an ex-
ploration of what it means
to say that the process is natural and ratio-
nally intelligible, so as to specify further this
key orientational term.
The content of the process is natural in
the most obvious sense of implying no su-
pernatural entity that exists external to the
process and intervenes in the flow of the pro-
cess. Yet this is not a positive statement
about what is natural. Rather, I take the term
natural positively to include all those enti-
ties and processes, animate and inanimate,
material and emergent from material, that
represent potential subjects of study in all
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the natural sciences, or that are the products
(such as human culture or art) of entities and
processes included among those studied in
the sciences. To say that the content of the
process is natural is to use a shorthand for
all of these entities, processes, and their prod-
ucts. By saying that the process is natural, I
do not mean to say at any point that there is
a process separate from these natural enti-
ties and processes. There is not a reified or
hypostatized process here—no elan vital, but
simply a heuristic term for denoting the en-
tirety of the natural entities and processes
without which we could not and would not
be speaking about a natural process. There
is no natural process without the natural en-
tities and processes that constitute it.
Since it is natural, the process is also,
in principle, rationally intelligible. If the en-
tities and processes exhibiting the regulari-
ties that the sciences discern constitute the
entirety of the process, then none should, in
principle, be beyond human rationality. The
process is rationally intelligible only in prin-
ciple, though, since human rationality faces
the dual limits of human perception and of
the character of the phenomena observed.
A good example is the current status of Su-
per String Theory. 8 It proposes to explain
the fundamental quantum compositional el-
ements of the universe via "strings" of
Planck length ( 10"33 centimeters) that vibrate
at various frequencies and thus give elemen-
tary particle/waves their character. Since the
human ability to perceive entities is limited
to sizes much larger than Planck length, the
theory cannot be tested directly. The limits
of human perception impose corresponding
limits on rational understanding—at least as
we would want it to be rigorously verified
through observation. Even if humans could
perceive Planck-length entities, however, the
nature of these entities as both very small
and very fast (as quantum mechanics shows)
would mean that scientists could not simul-
taneously give both the position and the ve-
locity of these entities and, therefore, could
not have the full knowledge necessary to
predict future events. Quantum mechanics
could thus only provide an account of the
probability of a string existing at a certain
position and velocity. (I return to this topic
below.)
So while the process is, in principle, ra-
tionally intelligible, there may be practical
limits to the human ability to know it com-
pletely. Still, these limitations come at the
very boundaries of knowledge and not in the
understanding of the broad outlines of the
process that are important when seeking ori-
entation for human lives. Moreover, it must
always be borne in mind that while attempt-
ing to understand and orient oneself within
this natural and rationally intelligible pro-
cess, one is oneself always already both natu-
ral and rational, and always already within
the very process that one seeks to understand
and orient oneself within.
1
'
"That gives rise to..."
Saying that one finds oneself within a
natural and rationally intelligible process is
not, however, to say what occurs within that
process—although certainly in specifying it
as natural and rationally intelligible, one in-
dicates something of what is included in the
form of Big Bang cosmology and evolution-
ary theory. In this section, I will further
specify the process as "giving rise to" all that
exists. I will argue for this formulation both
negatively with regard to what I see as the
weaknesses of alternative formulations, and
positively with regard to the strengths of my
proposed formulation, gives rise to.
Alternative formulations
In the Western Christian tradition in
which I grew up, that process that gives rise
to all that e.xists is usually described in the
language of creation and creativity, entail-
ing agency and purpose. Such descriptions
often make an analogy between human acts
of creativity and the initial act of creativity
that results in the grand cosmic creation. Al-
ternatively, and with even more emphasis on
puiposive agency, some descriptions draw
out the analogy of human designing to the
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notion of a designer of cosmic clockwork.
In my naturalist perspective, these formula-
tions present several difficulties, specifically,
their emphasis on puiposive agency, their
implicitly static view, and their anthropomor-
phism. The question is whether such at-
tributes as puiposive agency, the unfolding
of a static (once for all time) design or cre-
ation, and human-like activities are appro-
priate to the natural and rationally intelligible
process within which I am attempting to for-
mulate a meaningful and ethically orienta-
tional cosmology.
Formulations implying a unitary purpo-
sive agency that creates or designs the pro-
cess present me with particular difficulty.
Within my naturalist perspective grounded
in the natural sciences, the first difficulty is
that they violate the chain of relationality and
causality either in a proposed non-temporal
initial act of the agent, or in the proposed
continual action of the agent. This violation
then results in a violation in the intelligibil-
ity of the process, for if supernatural causa-
tion prevails, it need not be intelligible to
human rationality. Indeed, the claim that the
ways of the world are inscrutable and incom-
prehensible often accompanies the assertion
of a unitary agency and the formulation of
the existence of the cosmos as a creation.
Such claims are usually not made in the case
of a formulation of the cosmos as design.
But causal regularity and intelligibility are
not the only factors that make these agential
formulations difficult to support from a natu-
ralist perspective.
The character of the process itself raises
difficulties for creation or design metaphors.
While some descriptions view the cosmos
as a creation or design with a puiposive in-
tent, usually for the benefit of humankind,
from all that the natural sciences seem to
suggest, the cosmos does not itself display a
unified purpose, let alone one that favors
human beings. That the process is purpo-
sive is simply not borne out by scientific un-
derstanding. Human beings, for all the in-
terest they hold as a self-aware and agential
species, are not specially valued by the cos-
mos as the "crown" of the process. Rather,
in the account the natural sciences give, hu-
man beings are one more part of the process
(which is, after all, not separate from its
parts). Moreover, for a naturalist perspec-
tive, to predicate of the process a preference
for individual entities within it seems unten-
able without reifying the process itself and
predicating a puipose of the process that the
sciences do not support.
A second difficulty with creation and
design formulations is the relatively static
view that they present of the cosmos. If the
cosmos is either created or designed, it is a
once-for-all-time kind of operation. One can
go in two directions with creation and de-
sign, yet both turn out with a fairly static
view. On the one hand, one can say that the
creator or designer created or designed ev-
erything as it currently is. All that is, is as it
is, by the intention and the single creative
action of the creator. Most have abandoned
this claim, however, given that both Big Bang
cosmology and evolutionary theory suggest
temporal development and change. On the
other hand, one can say that the creator or
designer created or designed the cosmos via
these natural operations so that it would turn
out exactly as it has. This view, however,
seems to deny meaningful development by
turning the process into a more gradual ver-
sion of the first contention, that all exists as
it is by the intention and creative action of
the Creator. While this second option is not
falsifiable, its heuristic usefulness is ques-
tionable. If the emergence of all that exists
can be understood via a scientific framework,
why add another hypothesis that carries with
it the additional difficulties of positing a su-
pernatural agential being? '"
A third set of difficulties arises from
formulations relying on creation and design
metaphors; these relate to anthropomor-
phism. A certain amount of anthropomor-
phism may be unavoidable, because we try
to understand the cosmos via what we know
best: ourselves. The question is whether
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some forms of anthropomorphism are more
appropriate than others, given the character
of nature that the sciences represent in their
best approximations. Certainly, given the
two previous arguments, unified agency and
creativity or design toward a purpose seem
to be inappropriate forms of anthropomor-
phism. Similarly, other forms of anthropo-
morphism that often accompany creation and
design metaphors, such as the attribution of
gender, emotive expression, and independent
rational intelligence to the creator or de-
signer, seem inappropriate as predicates of
the process when viewed naturally.
Other human characteristics, such as
emergence, relationality, and finitude,
In the end, metaphors of creation and
design entangle me in too manyforms of
anthropomorphism that seem inappro-
priate for me to deem these formulations
as the most heuristically useful in ori-
enting myself to the process.
might be appropriate predicates for at least
parts of the process, and relationality might
be appropriate for the process as whole. In
the case of emergence, relationality, and
finitude, however, I have to wonder
whether their applicability stems from the
fact that humans are parts of the process,
rather than from the fact that the process
exhibits human-like characteristics. In the
end, metaphors of creation and design en-
tangle me in too many forms of anthropo-
morphism that seem inappropriate for me
to deem these formulations as the most heu-
ristically useful in orienting myself to the
process.
Strengths of "gives rise to.
.
."
In contrast to these difficulties with
agential, static, and inappropriately anthro-
pomorphic formulations, the formulation of
the "frame of ultimate significance" as that
process that gives rise to all that exists has
notable virtues—most especially in avoid-
ing the very difficulties into which creation
and design metaphors fall. First, gives rise
to does not imply a unitary purposive agent
such as a creator or a designer, but rather
allows one to take into account the plural-
ity of causal relationships within the pro-
cess. It is this plurality that constitutes the
process itself. There is no process sepa-
rate from the plurality. Indeed, even such
things as the non-local influences hypoth-
esized in some versions of quantum me-
chanics can be considered as potentially ef-
ficacious in that process giving rise to all
that exists. In this re-
gard, like process,
gives rise to can be
both concrete in its
acknowledgment of
natural causal rela-
tionships, and also
sufficiently vague to
allow for the devel-
opment and refine-
ment of human
knowledge."
Secondly, gives
rise to has the virtue of conveying the kind
of temporal dynamism that the natural sci-
ences observe in the cosmos. The process
qua process continually gives rise to all that
exists, and the flip side is that the process
also includes the constant passing away of
entities. Also within the framework of dy-
namism, gives rise to can convey a sense
of continuity and interrelationship between
past, present, and future events. Such con-
tinuity and interrelationship is fundamen-
tal to the pictures that the natural sciences
give of the cosmos in which nothing exists
that is not related to other entities in all tem-
poral modes.
Thirdly, gives rise to is not immedi-
ately anthropomorphic but can be consid-
ered as "nature-morphic." It is precisely
the character of natural phenomena, I would
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argue, that they arise as a result of other
phenomena, and that they give rise to still
other phenomena through their existence.
As chaos theory and Bell's theorem sug-
gest, every existent entity is influencing the
existence of other existent entities at every
possible moment. Chaos theory shows that
one cannot predict how influences will
combine to affect the future. 12 And Bell's
theorem shows that a quantum entity can-
not be completely isolated from influences
extraneous to those imposed in a labora-
tory experiment. 13
In light, then, of both the difficulties of
traditional formulations, such as creation
and design, and the considerable strengths
of gives rise to, naturalistically viewed, I
conclude that gives rise to is the more ad-
equate descriptor of what occurs within the
process that I propose as the "frame of ulti-
mate significance" for human orientational
meaning and ethical systems. It is non-agen-
tial and non-purposive, allows for the com-
plexity of natural causation and expresses
the dynamism and change of the natural
world. Moreover, gives rise to, like pro-
cess, is open to changes and amendments
that may occur subsequently in the natural
sciences.
"AM..."
From what I have argued so far, an en-
tire section on the definition of all might
seem odd; but in the context of previous
human meaning and ethical systems, such
as the world religions, the question of
whether the process gives rise to all that ex-
ists becomes a pressing issue. Some previ-
ous religious orientational systems have pos-
ited separate origins for different aspects of
the cosmos 14—such as the famous
Manichean formulation of a strict dualism
of matter and spirit, evil and good; or the
Greek formulation of the One and the
Demiurge, the first identified with the Good
and the second identified with the creation
of the natural world and the root of evil
therein. I will argue both negatively and
positively for my contention that the process
gives rise to all that exists. In the first part,
I will address alternative formulations; and
in the second I will argue for the strengths
of my own proposal.
Alternatives to" all"
Dichotomies arise in the Western tradi-
tion 15 especially when philosophers and
theologians address the question of evil and
the question of human uniqueness. In the
case of the former, some have proposed two
different sets of originary processes, one for
good and one for evil. In the latter case, some
have proposed a graduated scale of existence
in which the immaterial has a greater exist-
ence than the material. These graduated
scales interpret the material as having less
being and goodness than the immaterial. In
this section, I will look at the difficulties of
these two formulations in the context of my
naturalist orientation.
The question of evil presents a particu-
larly difficult human problem, especially for
Western religious traditions, which view the
deity as the good Creator of humankind. If
the Creator is good, some in these traditions
have argued that the deity cannot then be the
source of the evil in the world. There must
therefore be two sources: God and the devil,
or God and a demiurge that creates matter.
With such formulations in place, the reli-
gious objective becomes a flight from the
material world with an escape to the imma-
terial good deity. The on-going activities of
the world become a battleground for the two
hypothesized warring deities or forces.
My naturalist perspective has obvious
difficulties with such formulations, not only
because of their positing of agents exter-
nal to the process (as discussed above), but
also because they fragment the cosmos into
two separate and clashing processes. Given
that the natural sciences represent the cos-
mos as a unified process, such dichotomies
seem to have no place in a naturalist per-
spective. Just the same, because of their
prominence, I feel I must stipulate that the
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process gives rise to all that exists and ad-
dress the difficulty that produces the di-
chotomy in the first place. In the next sec-
tion, I will argue for a naturalist account of
evil in the context of the all to which the
process gives rise.
The belief in human uniqueness has
also been the occasion for a fragmented
view of the cosmos. When considering hu-
man uniqueness, the divide between mat-
ter and spirit is usually at the root of the
There is no need to introduce a
dichotomy orfragmentation into
the description of the cosmos to
accountfor the human perception
of evil; rather, evil as a concept can
be referred back to human beings
and their values, and both can be
seen as arising within the process.
fragmentation in the Western tradition.
Many authors propose that it is the imma-
terial soul that separates humans from ev-
erything else that exists. Following the idea
of the imago dei in the book of Genesis,
they identify the soul or consciousness with
God's image in humankind, who must then
turn away from the lesser things of the ma-
terial world and toward the more thoroughly
good things of the immaterial, spiritual
world.
This position again presents several
difficulties to my naturalist perspective.
Foremost among these is its separation of
the world into material and spiritual, with
the spiritual being closer to the source of
the world and the material being either a
degraded creation of the deity or a creation
of another god or demiurge. As a natural-
ist, I view what some religions have called
the human soul (consciousness or mind) as
emergent from the body and inseparable
from it. Moreover, there is no reason in
evolutionary theory to view the human spe-
cies as particularly unique, regarding spe-
cial valuation or goodness, but rather only
as different, in respect to all the character-
istics that distinguish it from the other spe-
cies. This difference does not place hu-
mankind outside material processes or
above other material entities; rather, in the
emergence of consciousness from matter,
evolutionary theory places humans
li squarely within the natural
world as a product of billions
of years of the development
of life-forms prior to the evo-
lution of Homo sapiens.
Moreover, biologist Ernst
Mayr has argued that humans
cannot claim consciousness
uniquely, since "traces of con-
sciousness are found even
among invertebrates and per-
haps protozoans." 16 In the
next section, I will provide
what I see as the beginning of
ii a naturalist understanding of
human difference and its inclusion in all to
which the process gives rise.
"All" in relation to evil and human
uniqueness
When I say that the process gives rise
to all that exists, I truly mean all from what-
ever perspective or scale one wants to look
at the cosmos— from quanta, chemicals, and
minerals, to bacteria, plants, and multicel-
lular animals, to planets, supernovae, and
dark matter—and also including things that
humans have not yet discovered—and may
never discover. Moreover, that each of these
is part of the process is the relational fact
that allows for continuity between and
among these entities and the various sciences
that study them. As a naturalist, I hold that
all scales of existence are meaningfully re-
lated, while at the same time I admit that
philosophers and scientists have not yet thor-
oughly formulated the details of this rela-
tion. 17 Since I am not only speculating about
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the nature of the process that gives rise to
the cosmos but also hope to provide for hu-
man meaning and ethics, I will at this junc-
ture provide a summary of what I take to be
an naturalist account of evil and human
uniqueness.
From my naturalist perspective, the con-
cept of evil is just this: a human concept
relating to the humanly perceived deleteri-
ous effects that human actions and other
natural phenomenon have on human lives
and on the rest of the natural world. There
is no independent force of evil, nor is there
any entity that is evil. Rather, there are hu-
man actions and other natural phenomena
that negatively impact—in the sense of in-
hibiting the flourishing of—human beings
and the rest of the natural world. IX Since the
human species arose via evolution within the
process, human values can be seen as inter-
nal to the process. The key distinction is
that these are values that human beings pro-
duce and overlay on other phenomena. It is
not the phenomena that have or possess these
values intrinsically. In this sense, there is
no need to introduce a dichotomy or frag-
mentation into the description of the cosmos
to account for the human perception of evil;
rather, evil as a concept can be referred back
to human beings and their values, and both
can be seen as arising within the process.
The case with regard to human unique-
ness is similar. Human beings are only
unique in the sense that they are different
from other natural entities. This species is
just as natural, just as existent, and just as
much a part of the process as other natural
entities. Just as human values (including
the concept of evil) arose within the pro-
cess via evolution, so too do the differences
between human and other natural entities.
Moreover, consciousness, that human fea-
ture usually singled out as unique, is one
more of the features that arise within the
process, and not something provided by an
external deity or world spirit. As Mayr
writes, "The human mind seems to have
been the ultimate product of a concatena-
tion of numerous miniemergences, in both
our primate and hominid ancestors." ll)
While the natural sciences do not yet fully
understand the emergence of human con-
sciousness, they do not cast doubt on this
emergence, but continue to provide good
evidence for the naturalist belief that even
something like consciousness that seems
immaterial is in fact an emergent property
of complex material systems. 20
Thus, while some human orienting sys-
tems have found it necessary to fragment the
cosmos in order to give accounts of evil or
human uniqueness, the unity of the cosmos
can be maintained, and evil and human
uniqueness can continue to be accounted for
within a naturalist framework. The all to
which the process gives rise includes even
these seeming intangibles of human creation,
since humans themselves are among those
entities comprising the all to which the pro-
cess gives rise.
"That exists..."
I have arrived at this point in explicat-
ing my proposal that the "frame of ultimate
significance" is the process that gives rise
to all that exists, assuming the actual exist-
ence of the process, the all, and its arising.
Many debates rage—both those internal to
the sciences in the philosophy of science,
and those external to the sciences in phi-
losophy and religion in general—about how
existence is to be understood. In this sec-
tion, I will explore what I take exist to mean
in light of philosophical and scientific con-
siderations.
Philosophical considerations
Along with many in the sciences, I con-
sider critical realism the most plausible
stance toward the question of what it means
to exist and to have knowledge of things that
exist. This philosophy was developed in re-
sponse to the epistemological questions of
science, such as, Does science really pro-
duce knowledge about the world, or does it
simply construct internally coherent linguis-
tic systems that have the pragmatic value of
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producing repeatable phenomenon? Accord-
ing to Delaney, critical realism holds
that the primary object of knowledge
is the independent physical world, and
that what is immediately present to
consciousness is not the physical
object as such, but some correspond-
ing mental state broadly construed. 21
Critical realism thus assumes the existence
of the physical world beyond human percep-
tion of it and takes on the challenge of find-
ing and testing ways of representing this
world to human consciousness.
In recognizing that the physical is rep-
resented in consciousness and not directly
present to it, critical realism recognizes the
place of the observer in all statements about
what exists. Perhaps it simply draws on
Descartes' argument that established the
doubting individual and moved outward to
affirm the world, but it goes beyond Decartes
to say that the way in which the observer
perceives the world in his or her representa-
tion will change how he or she understands
the world to exist. Still, these representa-
tions can be tested, and in that way a better,
more closely approximate, representation can
be found. The fitness of approximations can
be judged by whether they provide a neces-
sary framework not only for repeatable and
successful 22 experiments, but also for predic-
tion in future experiments and for the pro-
duction of these experiments and research
regimes themselves. Philosophically, then,
critical realism predicates existence of both
the observer and the physical world observed.
Scientific considerations: scale, duration,
and quanta
Yet the question remains as to how to
construe the existence of individuals within
the process, and how to differentiate these
individuals qua individuals. With regard to
scientific considerations of the question of
existence, I will break the question of exist-
ence down into the questions arising in the
context of scale, duration, and quantum me-
chanics—since in a spatiotemporal process
these are the key dimensions that determine
whether the question of an entity's existence
can be considered concretely. (The exist-
ence of non-spatiotemporal entities can be
considered, but only in the abstract logic that
explains why the hypothesis of an agential
God external to the spatiotemporal universe
is a non-falsifiable hypothesis.)
With regard to scale, the question of an
individual's existence is particularly compli-
cated, because one can view any object of
human perception from many different
scales, from the subatomic level to the level
of organism. If one knows every molecule
that makes up a person, does one know the
person? Not entirely. If one knows that
water is made up of two hydrogen molecules
and one of oxygen, does one know that wa-
ter exists in three phases? No. Conversely,
if one has just slipped and fallen on a patch
of ice, does knowing the molecular struc-
ture of water give any relevant knowledge
about the cause of one's newly broken ankle?
No. Each level of scale tells something,
while none is exhaustive of the whole. The
key thing is to determine which is the rel-
evant level of scale, given the operation of
understanding with which one is concerned.
At the same time, I would submit that
there are unifying levels, primarily levels of
organization, that can help to identify the
existence of individuals. Subsidiary parts
of an entity may change, but as long as the
organizational structure remains, the indi-
vidual—whether it be a molecule or an el-
ephant—can be said to exist. For example,
the existence ofmy body can be investigated
at numerous levels, including molecular,
cellular, psychological, medical, and even
artistic; yet what makes it my body is the
particular organization of its many elements
and systems, together in a particular place.
In stipulating this, however, immediately
the question of duration arises. To say I ex-
ist at a particular place is to say I exist at a
particular time— I am a spacetime entity.
Moreover, I have a supervening organization.
My organization continues in both space and
time. No other individual can occupy the
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exact "placetime" (that is, place and time in
spacetime) that I inhabit, although some in-
dividuals, such as bacteria inside and on the
surface of my body, do inhabit places within
and on me. Moreover, with regard to exist-
ence as endurance, there are two perspectives
that are important to take into account: the
proximate and the ultimate.
Proximately, certain entities endure with
certain organizations, even though some com-
ponents change or pass «
away. The existence of
the individual is not
contingent on any one of
its component, but on
the organization; and the
entity no longer exists
when the organization
breaks down. Ulti-
mately though, given
the connection of all
spacetime to the Big Bang, it could be said
that everything has existed since the Big Bang,
though in changing organizational make-up.
Every entity that can be distinguished proxi-
mately by its organization is also ultimately
made up of components that comprise the
larger organizational framework, spacetime.
Some thinkers draw on just this analysis when
they say that each person is made up of star
dust. This is a statement about the ultimate
level of composition in which all that exists
can be traced back to the Big Bang.
This statement brings to the fore the two
key problematics of existence found within
science: quantum indeterminacy and quan-
tum non-locality. The problem of quantum
indeterminacy finds its systematic expres-
sion in the theory of Werner Heisenberg. He
showed that a particle's position and momen-
tum (or velocity) are related, such that the
product of the uncertainty of the position,
Ax, and the uncertainty of the momentum,
Ap, is greater than the Planck constant, h:
Ax Ap > h.
This means that one cannot make a precise
measurement of position and momentum
simultaneously. 23 The more precisely one
measures the position at a given time, the
less precisely one can measure the velocity,
and vise versa. One can, therefore, only pro-
duce a probability of any particular particle
occurring at a particular position with a par-
ticular momentum (or velocity).
In itself, some do not find this principle
disturbing. Indeed, many scientists do not
find it disturbing at all but see it simply as a
Consciousness, that human feature usu-
ally singled out as unique, is one more of
the features that arise within the process,
and not something provided by an exter-
nal deity or world spirit.
feature of small, fast, and brief entities, as
well as of the observational techniques. Oth-
ers, however, feel that this uncertainty en-
tails a fundamentally worrying instability in
the natural world, since at a quantum level
entities seem to remain probable rather than
actual until they are observed. As Herbert
writes:
Running parallel to the quantum facts,
quantum theory represents unmeasured
quons as waves and measured quons
as particles. Furthermore it regards
these unmeasured waves not as real
waves but merely as waves of
probability. 24
So, on the one hand, one could see the
uncertainty principle as describing simply a
state of experimental affairs, while, on the
other hand, one could say that the principle
implies that existence is in some sense de-
pendent upon observation itself. As a criti-
cal realist, I tend to believe that the former
is more the case than the latter: but that is
not to say that either is the more plausibly
held. Certainly there is something pecu-
liar about observation. At least it is true to
say that, when a scientist measures the po-
sition of a particle, it exists relative to him
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or her only in that position (since special rela-
tivity shows that position is always with ref-
erence to the position of something or some-
one else); but whether it is true that the par-
ticle only exists if measured is debatable.
Since even the best informed scientists
have not reached a consensus about the im-
plications, either epistemological or onto-
logical, of quantum uncertainty, as a non-
scientist I want only to note them and to say
that a full and scientifically rigorous orien-
tational cosmology would want to take full
account of them. Moreover, one implica-
tion that can surely be drawn, one that is
particularly relevant for my orientational
cosmology, is that the entities that make up
the world on the quantum level and at greater
levels of scale are intimately and inextrica-
bly interrelated. This is the case whether
one takes Heisenberg's principle as episte-
mological, ontological, or both.
Quantum non-locality is similar in na-
ture to quantum indeterminacy. Its implica-
tions can be regarded as epistemological, on-
tological, or both; regardless, in the end it
suggests an intimate relationality. Quantum
non-locality, as I understand it, basically re-
fers to the fact that no matter how one at-
tempts to isolate a quantum particle/wave,
it always displays a certain amount of dis-
turbance resulting from forces that one can-
not fully specify. Moreover, it says that
these forces are non-local, and that "no lo-
cal reality can explain the type of world we
live in." 25 Some physicists, among them
David Bohm and Erwin Schrodinger, argue
that all quanta are inextricably related be-
yond the speed of light via previous "phase
entanglement" during their close proximity
at or near the Big Bang. Their conclusion,
as Herbert writes, is:
Bell's theorem shows that the holistic
grammar of quantum formalism
reflects the inseparable nature of
reality itself. Beneath phenomena, the
world is a seamless whole. 2h
Others argue that non-locality is an episte-
mological issue relating, as does
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, to the
very nature of quanta as very small, very
brief, and very fast—and therefore more sus-
ceptible to perturbation than are gross enti-
ties of ordinary human perception, such as
rocks or hippopotami.
As a non-scientist, I am certainly not
going to resolve this debate. Still, like quan-
tum uncertainty, in either inteipretation, quan-
tum non-locality says something important
about the cosmos to which I seek to be re-
lated: the cosmos is, on a fundamental level,
highly relational. No entity can be fully speci-
fied without describing its relation to other
entities: and thus all existent entities, to one
degree or another, play a crucial role in con-
stituting (either definitionally or ontologically
or both) the existence of other entities.
In summary, then, within the context of
scientific considerations, exist means several
things. In the first place, from a critical real-
ist position exist means that the physical
world is, with or without human perception,
but that human beings are able to have knowl-
edge of its representation in their conscious-
ness through scientific and philosophical ap-
proximations. Secondly, with regard to scale,
exist means that an entity can be viewed from
many perspectives. I argue, however, that one
can discern an organizational level that dis-
tinguishes one entity from another. A third
understanding of exist may be found in the
context of duration, because the organiza-
tional level of the individual supervenes pre-
cisely because it endures, while all of the sub-
sidiary elements may change. When the or-
ganization breaks down, the entity no longer
exists, and the elements that once comprised
the entity will be incorporated into the orga-
nizational structures of other composite enti-
ties. In this sense, the elements of the pro-
cess exist both proximately as individuals,
and ultimately as parts of the overall process
arising from the Big Bang. Finally, at the
quantum level two different features of quanta
problematize the notion of existence. Quan-
tum indeterminacy may indicate an intrinsic
relation between existence and observation:
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it may indicate an extrinsic (to existence) but
unavoidable influence of the observer on the
observed. Either way, quantum mechanics
represents an intimately relational cosmos in
which every phenomenon impacts other phe-
nomena. Quantum non-locality likewise sug-
gests that the elements of the cosmos are, at
a fundamental level, intricately intercon-
nected, even if the question remains open as
to whether or not this relationality is
ontologically superluminal and non-local.
Conclusion, by way of possible
implications for meaning and ethics
Where am I left, then, once I have con-
cluded that I can indeed view the develop-
ment of the cosmos—including the Earth,
which includes me—as the process that gives
rise to all that exists'? I am left within the
process as I began, but with the difference
that, having specified at least some of the
character of the process via the natural sci-
ences, I can formulate some possible impli-
cations for human meaning and ethical sys-
tems. In this section, I will begin this for-
mulation in a preliminary and general way,
in what 1 hope will provide the outlines of a
project for further development. First of all,
I address the question of meaning, specifi-
cally, Why meaning? Next, I address the
question of ethics, specifically, What ethics?
Why meaning?
One might rightly ask why human be-
ings have such a need to make meaning in
the first place. Why does the question of the
meaning of existence follow most assuredly
on the heels of the admission of existence?
Sociologist Peter Berger sees these questions
as arising fundamentally out of the fear of
chaos and, ultimately, of death. 27 Through
meaning systems, human beings seek to avoid
the reality of both by imposing a vision of
order on the world, where order may other-
wise not exist. While it is certainly the case
that the fact of death imposes, at least on me,
an urgency that life be lived in a worthwhile
manner, I do not think, by accepting a natu-
ralist, scientific account of the world, that I
am necessarily imposing order where it might
not exist. Still, I recognize that I am engag-
ing in the age-old process of considering the
world beyond human beings to be of ultimate
significant to them. As Berger writes,
Every society is engaged in the never
completed enterprise of building a
humanly meaningful world. Cosmiza-
tion implies the identification of this
humanly meaningful world with the
world as such, the former now being
grounded in the latter, reflecting it or
being derived from it in its fundamental
structures.28
In fully admitting that I am creating meaning,
in a sense I believe that there is no other way
to function. For even if one says that there is
no meaning to human life in the cosmos, one
is still making a judgment about what is and
is not humanly meaningful, by constructing
meaning precisely out of meaninglessness.
I would argue, however, that if one is
bound to create meaning, then one might as
well do it against the backdrop of the best
possible information about the cosmos. This
is why it has been so important to me to
specify the "frame of ultimate significance"
to be that process that gives rise to all that
exists. In this way, I have been able to pro-
vide a potential basis upon which one could
give a naturalist and scientifically informed
account of human existence. From and to
this account, then, I can be answerable with
regard to a critical reception and interpreta-
tion of new scientific understanding of the
process. This accountability should keep my
meaning constructions from becoming ob-
viously inappropriate projections of human
desires and wishes onto nature, and from be-
coming obviously inappropriate projections
of human grandeur within the process.
This accountability is efficacious on sev-
eral levels. At one level, meaning systems
must remain open and flexible, given that the
natural sciences are constantly changing and
refining their approximations of nature. At an-
other level, meaning systems must be evoca-
tive enough to allow for continuity in the for-
mulation of meaningful relationships between
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human beings and with the rest of the natural
world. These evocative constructions (even
my own, that process that gives rise to all that
exists) must be constantly scrutinized so that
they do not become reified or isolated from
their status as constructions always account-
able to expanding scientific approximations.
Finally, we are always already within the cos-
mos, within the process. At the same time that
we create meaning by orienting ourselves to
the process, that process gives rise to us (and
perhaps other intelligent entities) as meaning-
creating beings. Somehow our meaning sys-
tems must acknowledge this fact, along with
the concomitant fact that we do not stand out-
side the process.
So why meaning? In the negative, be-
cause it is unavoidable. And in the positive
sense, consonant with the natural sciences,
because it is—at least in principle and poten-
tially—better informed and more accountable.
What ethics?
If it is accepted that meaning-making is
a practically unavoidable human endeavor,
and, moreover, if it is desirable to keep mean-
ing systems accountable by making them
consonant with the natural sciences, then
what are some of the concrete values that
might be formulated? What implications
/ would argue, however, that if one is
bound to create meaning, then one
might as well do it against the backdrop
of the best possible information about
the cosmos.
does it have for action in the world if people
orient themselves to that process that gives
rise to all that exists'? I have three prelimi-
nary suggestions of stances that seem con-
sonant with the processes that I have detailed
above. I put them forward in this conclu-
sion, knowing that there are other interpre-
tations of both the process and its implica-
tions, but also seeking finally to begin the
process of constructing a personally mean-
ingful framework for action.
Humility is the first stance I would sug-
gest. Human beings are within a process
some 1 3 to 20 billion years old, as far as we
can tell (at least within the current expan-
sion-and-contraction cycle of the cosmos).
Meanwhile, our species has been on the cos-
mic scene for only a tiny fraction of this time.
Temporally, humility seems appropriate.
Additionally, and consequent to the nature
of spacetime, humility seems appropriate
given our minute scale in comparison with
the universe. Spatiotemporally, we are
blinks in the process of cosmic arising. Like-
wise, evolutionarily speaking, we are blinks
in the arising of life on planet Earth. Bil-
lions of years and many epochs of geologi-
cal formation separate us from the arising
of the first life on Earth. Thus, closer to
home, humility also seems requisite. Who
are we, after all, to claim to understand the
cosmos or to take responsibility for the
Earth? We are doing pretty well, but we have
a long way to go; and no matter how far we
go toward these goals, the Earth and the pro-
cess in which it arises as a pan will continue
long after all humankind has passed away. I
start with humility because it chastens me
to take account ofmy real
situation and thrusts me
l
. .
once again into account-
ability to the natural sci-
ences.
Secondly, as humans
are conscious agential
beings, a stance of re-
sponsibility seems appro-
is priate. With proper hu-
mility about our status in the immense spa-
tiotemporal span of both the cosmos and the
earth, we can more fully see the aspects of
our lives in which we can really take respon-
sibility. Moreover, taking into account quan-
tum mechanics, we can more fully compre-
hend the deeply relational nature of reality
and, from that, see that it is crucial to act as
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responsibly as we can, even if we can never
know with full certainty that our actions will
achieve their intended results. We are alive
within an amazing, intricately relational pro-
cess; and just this fact alone, I would argue,
ought make us feel the responsibility to do
what we can to formulate appropriate actions
within the context of the natural world. As
conscious beings, we can at least take respon-
sibility for our own actions and, in this light,
begin from a naturalist perspective to address
the complexly interrelated issues of ecologi-
cal destruction, human overpopulation, and
human poverty.
Thirdly, I would argue that humble and
responsible cognizance of the process that
gives rise to all that exists should also include
a stance of celebration. Our life is short. We
have arisen on a small planet in a peripheral
section of an unexceptional galaxy. We arose
recently in the evolution of life on Earth—and
we are still arising. We arise, moreover, as
conscious and intelligent. As such, we are able
to contemplate the process of our arising in
the first place. To be properly oriented to all
of these facts, I would argue, we must celebrate
the first fact, that that process that gives rise
to all that exists exists at all, and that we arise
as existing within it. As Brian Greene writes,
It is truly inspiring that beings
confined to one planet orbiting a run-
of-the-mill star in the far edges of a
fairly ordinary galaxy have been able,
through thought and experiment, to
ascertain and comprehend some of the
most mysterious characteristics of the
physical universe. 2"
We must celebrate both our existence and its
intelligibility. This celebration should then
push us back into a greater understanding of
exactly what the nature of the process is, and
to humility and responsibility all over again.
Celebration returns us to humility and
responsibility, since it forces us to see that not
everyone can celebrate. Some have humility
imposed on them through poverty, disease, and
lack. They can neither define their humility
nor take responsibility with reference to the
process; rather, they have incommensurate
humility and an inability, due to unjust circum-
stances, to take responsibility. Full celebra-
tion in this sense is contingent on working in
humility and responsibility for the alleviation
of conditions that cause poverty, disease and
lack—both in the human realm and in the rest
of the natural world. In this sense, celebra-
tion is always provisional and anticipatory. It
is a call to more adequate understanding and
enactment of human relationships to other
humans and to the rest of the natural world. It
is a call to an understanding of the process that
has given rise to us and the rest of the cosmos,
and that allows oppression and destruction,
freedom and flourishing, both in the human
realm and in the rest of nature.
The process that gives rise to all that ex-
ists, to which we are oriented, gives rise to a
new day in which we may be appropriately
humble, responsible, and joyous. We are
alive. Many questions remain unanswered,
but the day arises to allow for continued in-
vestigation. Ignorance must not be an ex-
cuse for inaction, for fear of unintended con-
sequences. If life is to have meaning, we
must make it. in as full a consciousness and
understanding of the process as possible, so
that at the end of our lives we may say with
Maria Eugenia Baz Ferreira:
To all that is brief and fragile
superficial, unstable.
To all that lacks foundation
argument or principles;
To all that is light,
fleeting, changing, finite
To all that is light in weight
for itinerants
on this transient earth
Somber, raving,
with transitory words
and vaporous bubbly wines
I toast
in breakable glasses. . .
.
30
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1. The definition of existence will find
its proper place and fuller expression
below . For now, let me signal that I will
treat the question of what it means to exist
with reference to the spatiotemporal frame
in which existing means being related to
other existent entities; and I will treat the
question of the existence of an entity with
reference to its endurance with an internal,
relational, organizational structure. Both
of these formulations will then, in due
course, find problematization in the
context of quantum uncertainty and non-
locality.
2. Naturalist orientational cosmology:
each of these terms demands some
explanation. By naturalist, I mean that the
ultimate context of human life is the world
specified in the natural sciences and that
this world operates in the regular and
intelligible ways discerned by the natural
sciences. This meaning is in contrast to
those who argue that the ultimate context
of human life is supernatural, and that the
world's regularity and intelligibility is
violated by a supernatural being or force.
My naturalist account is fully integrated
with scientific ways of knowing and also
acknowledges the necessity of philosophi-
cal ways of knowing concerning questions
of epistemology and ontology in the
natural sciences. I also see the importance
of metaphorical ways of expressing the
knowledge both of these provisionally
produce. Finally, I recognize that scien-
tific, philosophical, and metaphorical
proposals are always provisional approxi-
mations of our best knowledge, rather than
timeless propositional truths; but I seek to
construct a system that can remain always
open and critically receptive to new
approximations. By orientational, I mean
that my proposal seeks to address human
questions of meaning and ethics and to
provide open and provisional systems in
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which individuals can address these
questions. By calling my proposal a
cosmology and in keeping with my
naturalist orientational perspective. I mean
to sa) that one studies the cosmos for
naturalist orientation. It is in relation to the
cosmos as a whole and in relation to all
that exists therein (including human
societies) that one seeks to orient one's life.
In this, I am making a distinction between
myself and not only those theologians who
would see the supernatural as the ultimate
frame of reference, but also those human-
ists who would see human society by itself
as the ultimate frame of reference. At the
same time, neither do I want my proposal
to be seen as a-theist nor as anti-humanist.
Regarding a deity, the proposal is neutral
toward this hypothesis, which for this
proposal is unfalsifiable and unnecessary.
Regarding humanism, the proposal is
supportive, but with the aspiration of
expanding the frame of reference in which
those concerned with human meaning and
ethics construct their systems.
3. At one stage in its development, I
assigned the word "God" to this process;
but I now believe that the "baggage" of
this term is too great for such an assigna-
tion to prove heuristically valuable. While
I would not mean a supernatural or
independently existing entity by the
expression, that process that gives rise to
all that exists, were I to denote it by the
word "God," many people would interpret
it as just such a supernatural and hyposta-
tized proposal. At the same time, since I
hope to construct a proposal that has the
potential to provide, at once, both a system
of meaning and of ethics, it will be
necessary at some junctures to make my
argument with reference to previous
explicitly theological proposals—as
theology is traditionally the realm within
which such arguments are made and such
orienting systems sought. However, I seek
to develop a naturalist orientational
cosmology, and not a theology.
4. Considerable rebate remains about
whether the Big Bang can really be said to
be a singularity, and ideologies cloud the
conclusion from many sides. However,
almost no one doubts in general outline
that the Big Bang is the ultimate source of
all of the phenomena that currently exist
and that humans perceive. Whether the
Big Bang we know is the first or one
among many in an infinite series of bangs
and crunches does not fundamentally
change the human orientational need for a
heuristic term that encompasses unity and
plurality. My understanding of Big Bang
cosmology comes primarily from The
Elegant Universe by Brian Greene, and
Foundations ofModern Cosmology, by
Hawley and Holcolb.
5. See Margulis.
6. This process, as it took place in
evolutionary biology, is well illustrated by
Ruse, who explores how evolutionary
biology became more and more precise in
its understanding of the natural world as
its scientific proponents gathered, and
emphasized the gathering of, more
evidence through the years.
7. The contention that an ethical system
can be developed from a consonance with
the natural sciences might cause consider-
able unease for some people. Earlier in
the development of the natural sciences,
perhaps one could not have proposed the
type of orientational cosmology that I am
proposing. Indeed, those who did are now
seen to have been mistaken—for example,
those who saw the regularities of nature to
indicate that the different species and
phyla were each the result of a static
creation and individual design. Currently,
however, at least the general trends of the
natural world towards expansion of the
cosmos and biological development of
planet Earth are well enough established
that one is likely to be correct in working
from them. At the same time, the natural-
ist orientational cosmologist, no less than
the scientist, should always be ready to
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amend her proposed cosmology in light of
new data, metaphors, or interpretations.
The burden of making a proposal is always
that one may be wrong; yet the possibility
of error cannot prohibit the beginning of
an endeavor, or no progress whatsoever
can be hoped for.
8. See Greene.
9. An interesting question, and one that I
leave unanswered for the moment, is how
to account for the intelligibility of the
process. Why is it that the cosmos is open
to human understanding? One possible
answer arises from the fact that the human
brain is among those entities to which the
process gives rise. The brain is—by its
nature as a pan of the process—fit to
understand the process. It would take a
stronger argument than that, though, to
convince me, at least. Many creatures, for
example, the non-humanoid higher
primates, have large brains that, according
to our best knowledge, are not capable or
intrinsically employed in seeking out
understandings of the process. Another
related question is how to account for the
status of mathematics. Why is it that math
is so well suited to use in understanding
the natural world? Is there some intrinsic
relationship between math and reality?
Many mathematicians themselves refuse to
answer this question. Much in mathemat-
ics seems to have no direct bearing on the
natural world. However, could it not be
the case (as it was with Einstein's use of
Riemannian geometry) that mathematics
proceeds ahead of the sciences and that
eventually, perhaps many centuries from
now, the sciences may discover exactly
how the math actually relates to the natural
world? I do not have an answer to any of
these questions, but it seems that a fully
adequate orientational cosmology that is
also philosophically rigorous would want
eventually to account for the fact that the
universe is intelligiblevia mathematics and
other human forms of cognition.
10. One answer to this question is that,
while science can explain all that arises, it
cannot account for the "beginning" of this
arising. This answer is a serious one and is
deserving of some reflection. One should
realize, however, that in giving the answer
one assumes a beginning, a matter that the
sciences are by no means decided on in the
sense of t = 0. String Theory suggests that
the cosmos does not reach t = 0, but rather
that the cosmos finds its smallest unit at
Planck length (10 " cm). At the same time,
different scientists have different motiva-
tions for concluding either for a beginning
at t = 0, or for an infinite process of
crunches and bangs that always exists,
never beginning or ending. At first glance,
those that conclude on the side of the t =
position seem more reasonable; yet as I
have studied the world religions, I have
come to believe that neither position is
essentially more reasonable; for example,
one could look to the vision of an eternal,
cyclical cosmos in some schools of
Hinduism. Rather, the ideological and
metaphysical frameworks that one brings to
the question can have both conscious and
subconscious influences on what one
decides. Whatever the case may be, the
hypothesis of t = is both an empirical
question remaining to be solved and, as the
Buddha said, "a question that tends not to
edification" (at least at the present time).
11. In its vagueness, a supernatural
element cannot be excluded by saying that
the ultimate frame of reference for human
meaning and ethics is the process that
gives rise to all that exists. It can be said
that this supernatural element appears
unnecessary within a naturalist perspec-
tive. At the same time, the process as
giving rise to also leaves open the question
of the beginning of the process—or lack
thereof. I am comfortable with this
ambiguity; and, with the Buddha, I am not
sure that questions of an absolute begin-
ning or of the eternality of the cosmic
process are ultimately of edifying value.
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For the type of orientation that I suggest in
the concluding section, what is most
important is an understanding of the
human location within a thoroughly
relational process, and not whether this
process has an ultimate beginning or
continues everlastingly.
12. My understanding of chaos theory
comes primarily from Hayles.
13. My understanding of the conse-
quences of Bell's theorem comes primarily
from Herbert's explanation.
14. 1 can provide only the briefest sketch
of such fragmenting or dichotomous views.
This sketch is bound to be a generalization;
yet because the formulation of the all can
only be understood in relation to such
fragmenting proposals, for heuristic
puiposes, I risk over-generalizing them.
15. Dichotomies and even greater
fragmentation also arise in many religions
and traditions. I simply use the Western
tradition, because it is the one most
familiar to me, the one in which I was
raised. More work could certainly be
done, however, regarding the dichotomiza-
tion and fragmentation of the cosmos in
the various meaning and ethical systems of
human histoiy. From a naturalist perspec-
tive, as odd as it is not to think of the
world as a whole or at least as constituting
a unified process, I would hypothesize that
the position of fragmentation certainly
finds expression in at least as many
traditions as the unified position.
16. Mayr, p. 241.
17. Wilson's Consilience may at least
provide suggestive avenues for further
understanding of their relation.
18. The concept of negative impact is a
human one and reflects human valuations
of our own existence and the rest of the
natural world. Sorting out negative impact
is very complicated and requires a case by
case analysis of costs and benefits of
particular actions and events. While I
mention "inhibiting flourishing" here as
one standard for measuring negative
impacts, there are certainly others,
including "doing harming," "interfering
with the natural course of things," and
"abuse." Each of these standards of
negative impact carries pluses and
minuses, and none is clear-cut as an
unequivocal standard. Were a naturalist
orientational cosmology to be truly
adequate, it would have to develop
sophisticated ways of adjudicating
competing claims, as well as of evaluating
different standards of what constitutes
both negative and positive impacts. By
my brief comments in the body of the
paper, I simply mean to indicate that it is
possible to make such judgment within a
naturalist framework and remain consis-
tent within the rest of the system.
19. Mayr, p. 241.
20. Again, as is the case with human
valuation of evil or deleterious effects, the
natural sciences' understanding of con-
sciousness and the human mind is very
complicated. Moreover, much remains to
be understood about the exact relationship
of human beings to their primate ances-
tors. What can be said, as Lynn Margulis
has (in a lecture at Boston University, 19
November 1999), is that humankind
undoubtedly shares better than 98% of
their DNA in common with the higher
primates.
21. Delaney, p. 169.
22. The success of an experiment is by
no means unequivocal. What I mean here
is that the experiment produces results that
allow for further understanding and further
theory formation. Moreover, not all of the
sciences undertake experiments in the
same way as they are in chemistry,
genetics, or physics; but, as is the case in
evolutionary biology, some have to collect
and compare historical data, using the
process of the cosmos as the experiment
and, thus, having to deal with many more
variables than laboratory scientists have to.
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Construal of what it means to have a
successful experiment or successful theory
must, thus, be appropriate to the particular
scientific discipline in question. With my
discussion of experiments in the body of
the paper, I simply mean to give an
example of one possible way that a critical
realist comes to an approximate under-
standing of the cosmos that exists external
to him- or herself.
23. Herbert, pp. 68-69.
24. Ibid., p. 69.
25. Ibid., p. 245.
26. Ibid., p. 242.
27. Berger, p. 26.
28. Ibid., p. 27.
29. Greene, 117.
30. "To all that is brief and fragile," by
Maria Eugenia Baz Ferreira. In Earth
Prayers from Around the World: 365
Prayers, Poems and Invocationsfor
Honoring the Earth. Ed. Elizabeth
Roberts and Elias Amidon, 187. San
Francisco: Haiper Collins, 1991.
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